Rail Transit and the Question of Security

In India, this plan aims to seamlessly connect the northeastern states, often referred to as the ‘Seven Sisters,’ with the rest of the country. These states are geographically isolated from mainland India, linked only by a narrow 22-kilometer corridor between Bangladesh and Nepal. The Indian media outlet, Times of India, has highlighted the strategic importance of this connection. Currently, Bangladesh Railways is integrated with the Indian Railway network at five ‘Operational Interchange’ points, facilitating international rail communication between the two countries. However, no Indian train has ever traversed directly through Bangladeshi territory until now.

The provision of train transit in India raises several significant concerns. One of the primary issues is the uncertainty surrounding the nature of the cargo these trains will transport. There is apprehension that, in addition to civilian goods, India might use this transit route to send armed forces or military equipment through Bangladesh. This scenario could potentially escalate tensions between China and Bangladesh, especially considering the proximity of the transit route to the Doklam Valley, a region where Indian and Chinese military forces recently faced off.

If these trains were to carry military equipment, they would inevitably become targets in the event of a conflict between China and India. Such a situation would drag Bangladesh into a conflict that is unrelated to its national security interests. The Sino-Indian conflict is not Bangladesh's concern, and it should remain so in the future. Allowing rail transit to India under these circumstances would compromise Bangladesh's long-standing geopolitical neutrality. Consequently, Bangladesh would be perceived as a military-strategic ally of India, which could severely impact Dhaka's future relations with Beijing.

In essence, granting rail transit to India would align Bangladesh with Delhi in the ongoing geostrategic conflict between India and China. This alignment would not be well-received by China and could have far-reaching implications for Bangladesh's diplomatic and strategic positioning. The historical neutrality of Bangladesh would be at risk, and the nation could find itself entangled in a conflict that it has no stake in, thereby jeopardizing its future partnerships and regional stability.

Providing train transit to a troubled region of India is not a prudent decision. To understand the implications, we must look back to 1931 when Japan launched a false flag campaign in Mukden, north-central China. On September 18, 1931, Lieutenant Suemori Kawamoto of the Japanese Army detonated dynamite near the South Manchuria Railway, an act intended to blame the Chinese, who were in conflict with the Japanese army at the time. This incident served as a pretext for Japan to launch a full-scale invasion of Manchuria, ultimately establishing a Japanese puppet state in the region. This historical event underscores the complexities and potential dangers of using transportation infrastructure as a strategic tool in geopolitical conflicts.

In the present context, India appears to be positioning Bangladesh into the crosshairs of an India-China military conflict. Currently, trains traverse the Siliguri Corridor, a narrow 22 km wide strip known as the 'Chicken's Neck,' which connects the northeastern states of India with the rest of the country. This corridor, flanked by Bangladesh and Nepal, is crucial for the transportation of both military and civilian goods. To reduce dependence on this vulnerable corridor, India is planning to build an alternative rail link through Bangladesh, connecting its northeastern states with other parts of the country. This initiative is part of a broader strategy to enhance connectivity and mitigate risks associated with the 'Chicken's Neck.'

The strategic importance of the Siliguri Corridor became particularly evident in 2017 during the Doklam standoff between India and China. The corridor's proximity to the disputed territory heightened India's concerns about its security and logistical vulnerabilities. By constructing an alternative rail route through Bangladesh, India aims to safeguard its transportation network from potential disruptions. However, this move could inadvertently draw Bangladesh into an inevitable military conflict with China, even if Bangladesh wishes to remain neutral. The geopolitical ramifications of such infrastructure projects highlight the intricate balance between national security and regional stability.

Many are aware of the thesis paper authored by Hakan Fidan, the former chief of MIT, the Turkish intelligence agency. This thesis, which was submitted around 1999, received approval from three assistant professors and one thesis supervisor at the Department of Economy and Social Sciences of Bilkent University, Turkey. Fidan's extensive studies in the intelligence field have garnered significant appreciation for his work. His thesis, particularly its most explicit topic on foreign policy, unveils some startling revelations.

When we talk about covert operations, we typically refer to the insertion of sleeper agents into other countries to serve their own interests. However, in diplomatic terms, covert action is more formally known as "Foreign Policy Implementation and Intelligence." Essentially, this means that a country's foreign policy, pursued by any means necessary, is considered a covert operation or action.

Firstly, Fidan's thesis delves deeply into the intricacies of these covert actions, shedding light on how nations deploy intelligence strategies to achieve their foreign policy objectives. The thesis underscores the critical role of intelligence in shaping and executing foreign policy, often blurring the lines between diplomacy and covert operations. This comprehensive study not only highlights the strategic importance of intelligence but also raises important ethical and political questions about the lengths to which countries will go to protect their interests.

Secondly, the methods a powerful country employs to achieve its foreign policy goals include propaganda, military instruments, diplomatic instruments, deep penetration, and covert operations. Hakan Fidan, in his thesis, emphasized a crucial point: a militarily strong country can dominate others more effectively than an economically strong one. For instance, Japan is currently a significant economic power, yet its military strength is comparatively limited. Conversely, the former Soviet Union had a relatively weaker economy but possessed substantial military power, which enabled it to be a superpower. Therefore, when you have a militarily strong ally, your primary responsibility is to develop a robust military and intelligence department of your own. This strategic approach is exemplified by Pakistan's development of nuclear weapons.

Thirdly, the boldness India has demonstrated today in constructing a railway line within Bangladesh did not materialize overnight. Over the past fifteen years, India and its intelligence wing have systematically infiltrated Bangladesh with the cooperation of the government. Fidan provides an illustrative example of this in his thesis: when the United States invaded Grenada in 1983 and Panama in 1989, they first infiltrated the governments through intelligence agencies. Subsequently, they conducted military operations, capturing secret phone call records and video footage of various government officials. By infiltrating the government, they ensured there was little resistance later on.

Fourthly, the strategic infiltration and subsequent military actions underscore the importance of intelligence operations in achieving foreign policy objectives. The United States' approach in Grenada and Panama highlights how intelligence agencies can pave the way for military interventions. By gathering critical information and compromising key government officials, they create a scenario where military action becomes almost inevitable and faces minimal opposition. This method of combining intelligence and military force has been a cornerstone of powerful nations' foreign policy strategies, ensuring their dominance on the global stage.

Over the past fifteen years, Indian intelligence has executed similar operations in Bangladesh. While they have occasionally granted indemnity to the Bangladeshi government, they have also acquired the personal information of thousands of government officials and employees. Consequently, corruption records of former police IGPs, commissioners, and retired personnel have surfaced. Hakan Fidan noted that when a country seeks to infiltrate another or conduct covert operations, it first suppresses the opposition. This is achieved by funding government parties, as part of their foreign policy strategy. Covert operations are also employed to suppress opposition forces. In this context, the execution of high-ranking leaders of the Indian Anti-Aggression Jamaat and BNP stands out as one of the most successful covert operations by Indian intelligence, enabling India to advance its long-term aggressive foreign policy.

Fidan further elaborated in his thesis that when an independent state relinquishes its sovereignty through successive negotiations, it indicates that the backbone of the country's high officials and military personnel has been compromised. Historically, cross-border invasions were common, with one country launching full-scale military attacks on another. However, in the modern era, such invasions are less acceptable globally. Instead, countries achieve their objectives by installing loyal heads of state in other nations. An aggressive foreign policy is typically implemented when the government of the target country is fascist, depopulated, and paranoid.

In earlier times, direct military invasions were the norm, but today, the subtler approach of influencing political leadership has become more prevalent. This shift reflects a broader change in how countries exert influence and pursue their interests on the global stage. The strategic placement of loyal leaders in foreign governments allows for the implementation of aggressive policies without the overt use of military force. This method not only achieves the desired outcomes but also minimizes international backlash and maintains a facade of legitimacy.

India's prolonged delay in finalizing the Teesta water-sharing agreement has exacerbated tensions with Bangladesh, leading to widespread protests and growing discontent among the Bangladeshi populace. This perceived discriminatory behavior by India has fueled the momentum of the India boycott movement within the country. Given this backdrop, many find it perplexing that Dhaka has agreed to the train transit proposal with India.

The aspiration of generating billions of dollars through land and sea transit, transshipment, or corridor facilities provided to India has been a recurring topic of discussion. Despite these lofty promises, some continue to advocate for rail transit, transshipment, and corridor initiatives, citing benefits such as enhanced connectivity, increased productivity, and improved passenger transport. However, a critical question arises: why are Indian businesses not utilizing these facilities, even when the tolls are as low as one-twentieth or, in some cases, one-tenth of the usual rates? Additionally, there is concern that India will use the Chittagong and Mongla ports at nominal costs, further complicating the economic dynamics.

In light of these issues, the decision to proceed with the train transit proposal remains contentious. While some argue that it could bolster economic ties and regional connectivity, others fear it may disproportionately benefit India at Bangladesh's expense. The debate continues, reflecting the complex interplay of economic aspirations and geopolitical realities.

In 2010, the transshipment fee was 10,000 takas, but it has now been reduced to 500 takas. Compared to the fixed charges of 2010, the current transshipment charges are collected at 20% of the original fee. The primary purpose of these corridors—whether land, sea, or rail transit, or transshipment—is not trade but rather India's military and security solutions. Due to the lack of developed use cases for these commercial applications, Bangladesh does not generate significant revenue from them. In the case of sea transit, the revenue is so low that it does not even cover the dredging costs. Similarly, for roads and ports, there has been no development of a business case that accounts for the costs of route construction, maintenance, administration, and security.

This raises the question: does India truly aim to earn substantial foreign currency from Bangladesh's transit, transshipment, and corridor fees? If that were the case, we would see a reflection of this intent in the revenue generated from these fees. The current revenue from transshipment and transit fees does not suggest a significant financial benefit for Bangladesh.

Take the Feni Bridge as an example. Despite the lack of commercial viability, the road for the Feni Bridge and the Feni-Tripura route has been constructed over the Feni River at the cost of hundreds of crores of rupees. Operating a route requires transactions, and without unilateral imports or significant exports, ports and transit routes lack commercial feasibility. The Mongla Port faces a similar issue; full ships often have to travel empty or vice versa, rendering the port ineffective for generating substantial revenue.

The pre-1965 railways have already been reactivated for passenger transport, significantly boosting travel to India for medical, tourism, and shopping purposes. Notably, there was no rational protest against the 1965 East Rail Line movement. So, why is there opposition now? If the previously established transit, corridor/transshipment, or bilateral trade and connectivity elements are mutually beneficial, then commercial discussions on new rail links can certainly be pursued. Naturally, new case studies could have been conducted to support this.

* Rail transport in Bangladesh has historically not been profitable when relying solely on passenger services.

* Over the past decade, imports from India have tripled, indicating that the existing land and sea port infrastructure has not hindered the development of India-Bangladesh trade to the extent that would necessitate rail transport. Bangladesh is well-equipped with numerous land ports and multiple sea ports on three sides, facilitating bilateral trade with India without the need for separate transit transshipment corridors.

* There are at least 23 small and large land ports between India and Bangladesh. With the proposed Mujibnagar and Pragpur land ports, this number will increase to 25. Therefore, there is no infrastructure barrier to bilateral trade. The issue of corridor transshipment is more related to India's security concerns and military needs.

* While Bangladesh can address India's security concerns and military needs, the question remains: what does Bangladesh gain in return? The benefits should be evaluated in terms of trade, water management, flood control, democracy, and voting rights. For instance, in the fiscal year 2011-12, Bangladesh's imports from India amounted to $4.74 billion. However, by the fiscal year 2021-22, this figure had surged to $13.69 billion. This significant increase in imports raises questions about the balance of trade and the tangible benefits for Bangladesh.

* Bangladesh Railway is grappling with aging infrastructure, with over 100 bridges dating back to the British era. These bridges, many of which are over a century old, are in dire need of maintenance and replacement. The funding situation is dire, with only 35% of the budget coming from public sources and over 50% from private sources, leading to chronic underfunding. This underfunding hampers the railway's ability to modernize and expand, which is crucial for supporting economic growth and regional connectivity.

* Bangladesh is currently facing a debt servicing crisis concerning its external debt. This situation is exacerbated by the potential for incurring significant external debt for new railway projects included in the connectivity package aimed at protecting India's strategic "chicken neck" corridor. The financial burden of these projects could strain Bangladesh's economy further, raising concerns about long-term sustainability and fiscal health.

By considering these points, it becomes clear that the existing infrastructure is sufficient for current trade demands, and any new rail links should be carefully evaluated for their economic viability and strategic importance. Overall, it is unlikely that India will pay a substantial fee for transshipment that would cover the operational costs, security expenses, and loan liabilities. The primary purpose of these transit and transshipment corridors is not to facilitate bilateral trade or to transport goods for Indian traders. Instead, the main objective is to address India's security and military needs. This strategic focus raises questions about the equitable distribution of benefits and the long-term implications for Bangladesh's sovereignty and economic stability.