Post-Hasina Bangladesh: Redefining Relations with Pakistan

For years, a significant segment of Bangladesh’s population harbored aspirations for stronger ties with Pakistan. However, this sentiment remained largely suppressed due to the foreign policy orientation of former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, whose administration was deeply aligned with India. Under her leadership, Bangladesh’s diplomatic, economic, and strategic priorities were molded to fit a pro-India framework, often at the expense of fostering diverse international relationships. With Hasina’s departure, Bangladesh is now repositioning itself to embrace a more multifaceted foreign policy, allowing for the expansion of diplomatic, cultural, economic, and trade engagements with Pakistan—standard interactions that define bilateral relations between sovereign nations.

Sheikh Hasina’s tenure as Bangladesh’s prime minister was characterized by an overwhelming inclination toward India, shaping bilateral relations in a way that critics argue limited Bangladesh’s potential. Initially serving as prime minister from 1996 to 2001, she returned to power in 2009 and maintained an unbroken rule through successive, contentious elections. While she did not exhibit outright hostility toward Pakistan, her government’s pro-India stance left little space for exploring alternative alliances.

Her political adversaries, particularly the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami, frequently accused India of playing a decisive role in keeping Hasina in power. This perception was reinforced by her frequent diplomatic concessions to New Delhi and her reluctance to reciprocate Pakistan’s diplomatic overtures. Hasina’s approach ensured that she remained a favored partner of Indian political and business elites, even as public sentiment in Bangladesh leaned toward a more diversified foreign policy.

Despite Sheikh Hasina’s strategic alliance with India, Hasina’s grip on power became increasingly tenuous due to widespread allegations of electoral fraud and authoritarian governance. When mass protests erupted against her regime, her political legitimacy came under intense scrutiny. Ultimately, facing mounting pressure, she fled Bangladesh on August 5, 2024, seeking refuge in India. This departure marked a turning point, fundamentally altering Bangladesh-India relations.

Since her ousting, diplomatic tensions between Dhaka and New Delhi have escalated. Hasina’s continued involvement in Bangladeshi politics—through speeches and online statements from India—triggered widespread unrest. In February 2025, enraged protestors in Dhaka demolished a historic property associated with her father, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, symbolizing a rejection of her political legacy. Other monuments and murals related to her family were also targeted. Students at Rajshahi University led a symbolic act of renaming residential halls, removing nameplates they deemed as “symbols of fascism.”

India finds itself in a precarious position. While Hasina was instrumental in furthering its regional interests, openly shielding her from legal repercussions could strain New Delhi’s ties with the post-Hasina government. Given the deeply intertwined economic, security, and geopolitical linkages between the two nations—including a 4,000-kilometer shared border—India must now recalibrate its approach toward Bangladesh.

Under Hasina’s leadership, Bangladesh’s foreign policy was largely shaped to accommodate India’s strategic interests. Now, with her departure, Dhaka is asserting its sovereignty in diplomatic and trade matters, compelling India to negotiate rather than dictate terms. The prospect of a Bangladesh that independently navigates regional and global affairs introduces a new dimension to South Asian geopolitics. It necessitates a recalibration of India’s diplomatic posture, as Bangladesh is no longer an unquestioning ally but a nation that will assert its own interests in regional and international forums.

With this shift, Bangladesh stands on the cusp of a transformative era, one where its global engagements are not restricted by a singular alignment but shaped by a broader, more inclusive strategic vision. This recalibration not only opens avenues for deeper ties with Pakistan but also positions Bangladesh as a more autonomous player in the South Asian geopolitical landscape.

While there is no direct correlation between Pakistan and the cooling of Bangladesh-India ties, Islamabad quietly welcomes the evolving diplomatic landscape. As Bangladesh embarks on a new trajectory, its warming ties with Pakistan are evident, triggering concerns in New Delhi. Indian commentators increasingly express anxiety over direct air and shipping links between Dhaka and Islamabad, viewing them as a potential shift in regional dynamics.

This shift, however, is not exclusive to Pakistan. The changing climate in Dhaka presents opportunities for multiple nations to strengthen their ties with Bangladesh. In some cases, diversification in foreign relations is driven by immediate practical concerns rather than long-term strategic objectives. A key example is the recent tightening of Indian visa policies for Bangladeshis, which has made travel for medical treatment and tourism significantly more challenging. Historically, India was the top destination for Bangladeshi visitors, but as visa restrictions mount, travelers are redirecting their focus toward China, Malaysia, and other Southeast Asian nations.

Historically, Bangladesh-Pakistan relations have seen fluctuating fortunes. Begum Khaleda Zia, the first female prime minister of Bangladesh, served two terms (1991–1996 and 2001–2006) and pursued friendlier ties with Pakistan. The widow of General Ziaur Rahman, a key figure in Bangladesh’s liberation struggle and the founder of the BNP, Khaleda sought to counterbalance Hasina’s India-centric policies. Her visits to Pakistan in 1992 and 2006 were met with grand receptions, signaling a different diplomatic approach.

Regional forums like the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) once provided avenues for Bangladesh and Pakistan to engage, but the India-Pakistan rivalry has rendered the organization largely ineffective. The 2016 SAARC summit, which was to be hosted by Pakistan, never materialized due to tensions with India. Given these constraints, Bangladesh and Pakistan may look toward alternative platforms such as the D-8 Organization for Economic Cooperation and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) to foster collaboration. Hasina’s alignment with India had previously hindered Bangladesh from utilizing these platforms, as seen when she canceled a planned visit to the D-8 summit in Pakistan in 2012. With a renewed diplomatic direction, these organizations could now serve as vital channels for engagement.

Despite historical tensions, both Bangladesh and Pakistan acknowledge their deep-rooted cultural and historical connections. A brief period of conflict and political discord cannot erase centuries of shared heritage. This recognition was evident in the recent meetings between Bangladesh’s Chief Advisor Muhammad Yunus and Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif on the sidelines of the 79th United Nations General Assembly in September and later at the D-8 Summit in Egypt in December. To solidify this growing rapport, the next logical step would be state visits between Dhaka and Islamabad. With Hasina’s departure after 15 years of rule, Bangladesh’s political and diplomatic landscape is undergoing a profound transformation. The country’s foreign policy, once heavily skewed in favor of India, is evolving toward a more balanced and independent approach. While this shift has elicited mixed reactions—given the enduring impact of the 1971 Liberation War—Bangladesh appears poised to redefine its role in the South Asian geopolitical framework. Strengthened ties with Pakistan are part of this new chapter, signaling a broader reconfiguration of Bangladesh’s international engagements.

Over the past seven months, Bangladesh and Pakistan have taken significant steps towards improving their diplomatic ties, signaling a shift in regional relations. Muhammad Yunus, the chief advisor to Bangladesh’s interim government, has met twice with Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, but has yet to engage with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. This subtle change in Bangladesh’s foreign policy priorities is reflected in the increasing diplomatic activity from Pakistani officials in Dhaka since the political transition.

enthusiastic crowds, further strengthening people-to-people relations. Trade has seen a resurgence, highlighted by the arrival of Pakistani cargo ships at Chittagong port, a historic first since the 1971 war. This marks a shift away from decades of estrangement and paves the way for a thaw in bilateral relations.

Bangladesh, traditionally aligned with India under Hasina’s leadership, has experienced a rise in anti-India sentiment, leading to a reevaluation of foreign policy. Relations with Pakistan, once stagnant, have seen progress, particularly in trade. Between August and December 2024, bilateral trade increased by 27%, with both countries focusing on expanding sectors like pharmaceuticals, food products, and construction materials. A memorandum of understanding signed in January aims to boost trade further, with ambitious goals for future cooperation.

In terms of connectivity, travel restrictions have been lifted, allowing for easier movement between the two nations. Pakistan has also waived visa fees and removed security clearance requirements for Bangladeshi travelers. Educational exchanges are on the rise, with Pakistan offering 300 scholarships to Bangladeshi students.

Defense cooperation has also strengthened, with senior military officials from both countries meeting in January to discuss regional security, joint exercises, and arms trade. Pakistan’s military referred to Bangladesh as a “brotherly country,” hinting at a future of closer defense collaboration. These developments reflect a significant shift in Bangladesh’s foreign relations, with both countries aiming to reshape their regional engagement in the coming years.

Recent developments in Bangladesh’s defense strategy have highlighted a significant shift, particularly with its growing interest in acquiring JF-17 Thunder fighter jets from Pakistan. Developed through collaboration between Pakistan and China, these jets align with Bangladesh’s broader military modernization goals outlined in the “Forces Goal 2030” program. This marks a crucial step in enhancing Bangladesh’s defense capabilities and carries significant geopolitical implications, particularly concerning India. India, with its historical influence over Bangladesh’s defense and foreign policy, is closely monitoring this emerging relationship.

The growing ties between Dhaka and Islamabad raise concerns in New Delhi, especially given Pakistan’s longstanding rivalry with India. Adding another layer of complexity is China’s strategic role, providing both military and infrastructure support to Bangladesh and Pakistan, which could further alter the region’s power dynamics. India’s response has been cautious, with the Ministry of External Affairs reaffirming a close watch on developments impacting national security.

The Bangladesh-Pakistan relationship, once strained following Bangladesh’s independence in 1971, is undergoing a transformation. Diplomatic ties have been minimal in recent years, especially under Sheikh Hasina’s leadership. However, with Hasina’s fall in 2024 and the rise of a new interim government, there has been a noticeable shift in Bangladesh’s foreign policy focus. This includes warmer relations with Pakistan, symbolized by multiple high-level meetings, including between Muhammad Yunus, Bangladesh’s Chief Advisor, and Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif.

Economic ties are also strengthening, with Bangladesh looking to expand trade with Pakistan, especially in essential commodities. Pakistan sees potential in Bangladesh’s pharmaceutical industry, which offers cost-effective medicines, and is keen to increase imports from Bangladesh. Diplomatic exchanges are intensifying, with Pakistan’s high commissioner in Dhaka meeting with business leaders, political figures, and government officials to foster deeper collaboration.

A key element in this diplomatic thaw is the announcement of 300 scholarships for Bangladeshi students to study in Pakistan, alongside the removal of previous academic restrictions. These steps, along with improved engagement with political leaders, including the Bangladesh National Party (BNP), further signal a shift in Bangladesh’s foreign policy, as it seeks to distance itself from India and explore closer ties with Pakistan.

The Pakistani High Commissioner in Dhaka has carefully navigated sensitive political issues, particularly in relation to Jamaat-e-Islami, Bangladesh’s main Islamist party, due to its controversial role during the 1971 war. His caution was evident when he skipped a 2024 event commemorating Pakistan’s founder, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, acknowledging Jinnah’s association with the Bengali language suppression. The fact that Jinnah can now be publicly celebrated in Dhaka signals a significant shift in the political climate following the fall of Sheikh Hasina’s government.

This shift follows years of strained ties. In 2013, Bangladesh executed Jamaat-e-Islami leaders for war crimes, and in 2015, two Pakistani diplomats were expelled over terror financing accusations. Despite this, military cooperation between the two countries persisted, with ongoing exchanges and imports of military equipment like ammunition since August 2024. This thaw in relations is largely driven by mutual anti-India sentiments, signaling a reevaluation of old animosities.

The legacy of the 1971 war, during which Pakistan’s military committed atrocities, remains central to Bangladesh’s national identity. However, recent political changes, including a recalibration of foreign policy by Bangladesh’s interim government, reflect shifting priorities. Notably, Yunus’ interim government has called on India to extradite Hasina for alleged human rights violations, a request India has yet to address.

India, meanwhile, remains concerned about the treatment of its Hindu minority in Bangladesh. Although Dhaka denies accusations of persecution, India continues to highlight the issue, asserting that media disinformation has fueled the narrative. This complex diplomatic shift showcases how changing political dynamics are reshaping Bangladesh’s relationships with its neighbors.