Nuclear Doctrine, Strategic Calculations, and the Shifting Architecture of Power in the Middle East
Nuclear Doctrine, Strategic Calculations, and the Shifting Architecture of Power in the Middle East

The clock ticks on a delicate geopolitical stage as Iran once again finds itself at a critical juncture—caught between international demands for transparency, domestic divisions among its elite, and the ghosts of wars past and future. A deadline set just last week by U.S. President Donald Trump—urging Tehran to resume negotiations over its nuclear ambitions and broader regional behavior—has stirred visible ripples within Iran’s leadership circle. That deadline, though unofficial in its legal weight, has exerted significant diplomatic pressure not only on the executive apparatus of the Islamic Republic but also on the ideological nucleus orbiting around Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
Amid this tension, the Islamic Republic has chosen a familiar channel for communication: Oman. According to high-level Iranian sources, Tehran has relayed its response to President Trump through Omani mediators—a decision that underscores both the strategic trust Iran places in Muscat and the Sultanate’s long-standing role as a reliable interlocutor in times of heightened geopolitical tension. Iran’s Foreign Minister defended this indirect diplomacy, pointing out Oman’s well-earned credibility as a discreet and effective facilitator. “Oman has decades of experience mediating in the region,” he noted, “and the Iranian leadership sees Muscat as an indispensable bridge, particularly given Tehran’s continued refusal to engage in direct dialogue with the United States.”
While formal talks remain elusive, events are rapidly unfolding beneath the surface. Of particular note are the recent remarks delivered by Ali Larijani, a key figure in the Iranian establishment and former Speaker of Parliament. Now serving as an adviser to the Supreme Leader, Larijani is widely regarded as a moderate voice, often critical of hard-line dogmas. In a rare and striking television interview, he acknowledged the existence of a fatwa issued by Ayatollah Khamenei prohibiting the development of nuclear weapons. Yet he added a provocative caveat: should the United States make a “grievous error” and initiate military aggression, it might ignite a popular groundswell within Iran demanding the creation of such weapons.
His words, laced with strategic ambiguity, reverberated widely. “American strategists understand the dangers of attacking Iran,” Larijani warned. “Any such action would only push us closer to the nuclear threshold.”
This articulation of deterrence—delivered by someone known more for pragmatism than brinkmanship—suggests that the contours of Iran’s nuclear doctrine may be shifting. It reflects growing support within Iran’s political intelligentsia for at least the theoretical consideration of nuclear armament, particularly in the wake of deepening regional insecurity. Israeli strikes on Iranian targets following the October 7, 2023, Al-Aqsa Flood operation, combined with the weakening operational capacities of Iran’s key regional allies—Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon—have intensified Tehran’s sense of strategic exposure.
The psychological impact of these military setbacks has triggered a hardening of positions within Iran’s political elite. What once might have been addressed through diplomatic channels is now being met with ideological rigidity and escalatory rhetoric. The national mood, especially within conservative power circles, appears to be shifting from cautious engagement to fortified defiance.
Nevertheless, this hawkish turn is not universally endorsed. President Masoud Pezeshkian and former Foreign Minister Javad Zarif, both prominent figures within Iran’s reformist bloc, have championed a more pragmatic path forward. They remain committed to the idea of direct negotiations with Washington, advocating diplomacy over confrontation. Zarif, in particular, has long argued that engagement—however fraught—offers the only viable escape from perpetual international isolation and economic decline.
Yet the ultimate authority in the Islamic Republic, Supreme Leader Khamenei, has thus far resisted any overt move toward direct talks. While he has not categorically closed the door on negotiations, especially if certain concessions can prevent further strategic erosion, his posture has become notably more inflexible since Trump’s re-election. For Khamenei, negotiating under pressure or with what he perceives as an imbalanced power dynamic represents not diplomacy, but capitulation.
This distinction—between indirect engagement through trusted mediators and the perceived indignity of direct talks—continues to define Iran’s approach. Omani diplomacy has thus emerged as a halfway house, allowing communication without compromise. However, the undercurrent of escalation is undeniable.
Returning to Larijani’s provocative remarks, his assertion that “the people will push to defend the country” introduces a populist dimension to the nuclear debate. While he emphasized that Iran possesses the technological capability to manufacture nuclear weapons, he also underscored the existing religious prohibition—Khamenei’s fatwa—which ostensibly renders such an option morally impermissible. Yet Larijani’s comments also hinted at a legal-political gray zone: “The fatwa is not identical to a political directive,” he noted, despite its registration with the United Nations.
This subtle decoupling of religious doctrine from national defense policy triggered immediate and polarizing reactions. Culture and Islamic Guidance Minister Abbas Salehi responded firmly, arguing that Khamenei’s fatwa is “rooted in immutable religious principles” and not simply a matter of interpretative jurisprudence. In his view, the prohibition is foundational and cannot be altered to suit changing political winds.
The public discourse surrounding these statements has intensified, inviting scrutiny from across the ideological spectrum. Mostafa Najafi, a respected Middle East conflict analyst, expressed skepticism about Larijani’s logic. “This is not how deterrence works,” Najafi remarked. “Countries typically develop nuclear capabilities to prevent attacks—not as a reactionary measure post-conflict. Waiting until you’re attacked to initiate nuclear production is not only strategically flawed but practically catastrophic.”
He added, with palpable concern: “If a serious attack were to occur, what infrastructure would remain to even contemplate weapon development? The logic collapses under scrutiny. Far from deterring adversaries, such statements may only embolden them.”
Another sharp critique came from Ali Hashem, a Lebanese scholar with deep expertise in Iranian geopolitics. Drawing parallels to earlier threats issued by the late Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian at the start of the Gaza conflict, Hashem suggested that Iran’s recent rhetorical stance reflects desperation rather than strength. “Threats don’t deter attacks,” he asserted. “They reveal strategic anxiety, not confidence.”
Yet this chorus of rejection is not monolithic. Ataollah Mohajerani, a veteran of Iran’s influential Construction Party—founded by the late Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani—came to Larijani’s defense. He praised the interview as “well-timed and articulate,” framing it as a calculated warning rather than a policy pivot. According to Mohajerani, the articulation of a potential shift in nuclear doctrine serves as a credible safeguard—“a declaration aimed at protecting the Islamic Republic, its revolution, and its people.”
His interpretation underscores a critical tension in Iranian political culture: the fine line between declarative deterrence and policy evolution. While Khamenei’s fatwa remains formally intact, voices like Larijani’s are subtly recalibrating the national conversation, preparing both domestic and international audiences for the possibility—however remote—that this line could one day be crossed.
This recalibration is echoed within Iran’s military establishment. Yadollah Javani, political bureau chief of the IRGC’s Joint Command Council, affirmed that Iran would not hesitate to revisit its defense doctrine if the country faced credible threats. While his statement was measured, its implications were unmistakable: the Islamic Republic is keeping its strategic options open.
Such remarks raise a pivotal question for international observers and policymakers: are these statements mere negotiating tools, carefully deployed to extract concessions and prevent conflict? Or do they signal a deeper transformation in Iran’s threat perception—one that could lead to the abandonment of its long-standing nuclear self-restraint?
Should Iran pivot toward a nuclear weapons program, the regional fallout could be immediate and severe. Relations with Arab neighbors—particularly the Gulf states—would likely deteriorate rapidly. In recent years, Iran has made deliberate efforts to thaw these relationships, participating in diplomatic overtures led by Saudi Arabia aimed at regional stabilization. A shift in nuclear posture would almost certainly undermine this progress.
For Tehran, the stakes are extraordinarily high. Advocates of nuclear deterrence must consider not only the reactions of Washington and Tel Aviv, but also the broader Arab world, where confidence-building measures and economic cooperation are still in their infancy. A nuclear pivot would almost certainly derail burgeoning partnerships in tourism, trade, and security—areas that offer Iran a path to long-term prosperity and global reintegration. Indeed, many analysts argue that Iran has more to gain from sustained diplomacy than from nuclear brinkmanship. The diplomatic route, while complex and often exasperating, offers the most durable path to national security and economic recovery. Abandoning it in favor of a nuclear gamble could prove a pyrrhic victory.
Tehran stands at a crossroads. The ideological legacy of its revolution must now contend with the cold arithmetic of survival in a shifting regional landscape. While indirect talks via Muscat may serve the immediate need for dialogue, they cannot substitute for a durable strategic vision. Iran’s leadership must weigh the allure of deterrence against the cost of isolation.
The path ahead will demand not only wisdom but restraint. As regional tensions flare and global power dynamics continue to shift, Iran must decide: will it lean into the politics of defiance, or will it dare to engage in the difficult—but ultimately more rewarding—task of genuine diplomacy?
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