India-Bangladesh relation and water sharing

In August 1966, the International Law Organization convened in Helsinki, Finland, to address the critical issue of international river water usage and distribution. The resulting legislation established that countries where rivers originate cannot unilaterally alter their courses or construct dams without mutual consent. Instead, decisions regarding the main river and its tributaries must be made through bilateral agreements or negotiations among the countries involved. This legislation rejects the notion that ownership of a river is determined solely by its origin in a particular country.

Rather, it emphasizes the importance of cooperation and shared responsibility in managing transboundary rivers for the benefit of all nations involved. The Helsinki Accords marked a significant shift towards a more equitable and sustainable approach to water resource management on a global scale. By promoting dialogue and collaboration, countries are better equipped to address conflicts and challenges related to the use and distribution of international river waters in a peaceful and diplomatic manner. This landmark legislation has since served as a model for future international agreements aimed at promoting environmental protection and fostering cooperation among nations.

For instance, if a country wishes to build a dam or change the course of a river, it must obtain the consent of downstream nations. This principle is particularly relevant to the 54 rivers flowing from India into Bangladesh. Despite the legislation, India often exercises control over these rivers, constructing dams and regulating water flow at its discretion. Such actions have significant impacts on Bangladesh, highlighting the ongoing challenges in enforcing equitable water-sharing agreements. One detailed counterexample to the notion of ownership based on origin is the case of the Nile River, which flows through multiple countries including Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia. Despite originating in Ethiopia, Egypt historically held significant control over the river due to colonial agreements, leading to tensions with upstream countries like Ethiopia seeking to utilize the river for their own development. This example demonstrates that ownership and control of rivers can be complex and contested, with historical factors and power dynamics playing a significant role in determining access and usage rights.

If the rivers from the Indian mountains were allowed to flow naturally into Bangladesh, they would still cause occasional floods during high rainfall years and droughts during low rainfall years. However, the people of Bangladesh would have adapted to these natural patterns, and the government could have implemented proactive measures to manage these events. Now, with India's control over the rivers through various dams, the situation has become unpredictable for Bangladesh. The release or blockage of water by India disrupts the natural flow, making it difficult for Bangladesh to anticipate and prepare for floods and droughts. For example, when India unexpectedly releases a large amount of water from the dams during a rainy season, it can lead to devastating floods in Bangladesh. Conversely, if India decides to withhold water during a dry season, it can exacerbate drought conditions and harm agriculture in Bangladesh. In 2017, India unexpectedly released water from the Farakka Barrage in West Bengal, causing severe flooding in Bangladesh and displacing thousands of people. Conversely, in 2019, Bangladesh experienced a drought due to reduced water flow from upstream damming projects by India, leading to crop failures and food insecurity for many farmers. The recent floods have exacerbated the already dire situation for many people in Bangladesh.

In 1973, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution emphasizing that no state should undertake activities beyond its jurisdiction that could harm another state. As a member of the United Nations and a significant South Asian nation, India’s actions have considerable impacts on its neighbors. Consequently, India is expected to engage in thorough discussions and mutual understanding when undertaking projects like river damming. However, the extent to which India considers Bangladesh's interests in these matters remains a critical question. The 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, held in Stockholm, Sweden, underscored the principle that no country should engage in activities causing environmental damage to another nation. Despite this, India's construction of dams, including the Farakka Barrage, has been cited as a major contributor to environmental issues in Bangladesh.

Throughout various administrations, Bangladeshi governments have often sought favor with India to maintain their hold on power. This is largely due to India's superior military, economic, and geographical advantages. There is a prevailing belief among Bangladeshi political parties that India has the capability to influence government changes in Bangladesh. However, the July revolution of this year has debunked this notion. India was unable to safeguard the regime of their ally, the authoritarian Hasina government. The new government, born from the student-led movement, embodies revolutionary ideals and seeks to establish a foreign policy based on mutual equality with India.

It is now imperative to initiate bilateral discussions to reassess the management of international rivers and dams, in accordance with international laws and UN charters. If India refuses to engage in these talks on an equal footing and pursues a unilateral approach, the Bangladeshi government must highlight India's unilateralism in international forums and, if necessary, seek compensation through legal channels.

Despite numerous appeals from the ousted Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina for the Teesta Agreement's ratification, the issue has consistently been included in joint statements during bilateral visits but has failed to materialize. In a bid to find an alternative solution, Hasina sought China's assistance for the Teesta project, only for India to thwart these efforts at the last moment. Her visit to India on June 21-22, 2024, seemingly marked the end of any hope for the Teesta Agreement.

Post-visit analyses suggest that the Teesta water-sharing issue was effectively sidelined. Faced with uncertainties regarding water availability from upstream sources, Bangladesh considered a technical solution within its borders with Chinese support, which India opposed. The proposal for basin-based management, long advocated by experts, was also dismissed. India insisted on implementing the project solely within Bangladesh, focusing on the Teesta basin rather than a collaborative Bangladesh-India approach.

It is evident that one does not require expertise to recognize the ineffectiveness of bilateral discussions on the Teesta, given that no resolution has been achieved despite over seven decades of attempts. In this context, it is unnecessary to remind any head of government that the matter must be addressed at an international level. Unfortunately, this straightforward fact, documented for more than two decades, has either been misunderstood or ignored by previous administrations.

In an interview with PTI, interim head of government Dr. Muhammad Yunus candidly stated, "We must resolve this issue in accordance with international regulations." He emphasized that downstream nations possess certain rights, and it is imperative that these rights are acknowledged and upheld.

Dr. Muhammad Yunus's brief statements carry profound implications. For the first time, a Bangladeshi head of government has demonstrated the 'courage' to address the Teesta issue within the framework of international norms and the rights of downstream nations. The pertinent question is whether such international rules and protections exist for downstream countries. The answer is affirmative; there are not one, but two safeguards. When bilateral negotiations falter, two international legal frameworks provide protection for downstream nations. The first is the Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, commonly known as the United Nations Watercourses Convention of 1997. This convention serves as a robust safeguard for any downstream country, emphasizing the river's rights to uphold human rights.

The second framework is the Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes, abbreviated as the Water Convention. In Bengali, it is referred to as the United Nations Water Charter of 1992. This second convention is often considered more straightforward, effective, and convenient than the first in several respects.

Despite opportunities, Bangladesh has yet to capitalize on either of the two significant measures. The country's failure, particularly regarding the first measure, is notably profound. When the 'Watercourses Charter, 1997' was introduced at the United Nations, India, as the upstream nation, predictably opposed it, while Bangladesh, being downstream, supported it. However, such charters require not only voting or signing but also ratification by the national legislature. Since its inception, various river and environmental organizations, including the Riverine People, have consistently urged the government to ratify this document. Yet, the government has shown no initiative.

During the BNP regime from 2001 to 2006, Water Resources Minister Major (Retd.) Hafiz Uddin Ahmad Bir Bikram convened a consultation meeting with experts, including Prof. Dr. Asif Nazrul, to discuss the ratification of the UN Watershed Charter. Out of 17 participants, 16 agreed on the immediate need for ratification. However, for reasons that are understandable, the process did not advance further.

Destiny's favor is evident! When Chief Adviser Dr. Muhammad Yunus addressed the 'international norms and the rights of downstream countries' concerning the Teesta water issue, Asif Nazrul, serving as the advisor for the Ministry of Law, Justice, and Parliamentary Affairs, Expatriate Welfare and Foreign Employment, and Culture Ministry, has repeatedly expressed regret over the non-ratification of the Charter. The responsibility now lies with him. Initially, the second safeguard was designed exclusively for European nations, but since 2015, it has been accessible to all countries globally.

With the Awami League and BNP having relinquished the country's protection to two entities, will the interim government seize this opportunity? Otherwise, mere eloquent words will garner applause without achieving tangible results; the conservation and protection of shared rivers, including the turbulent Teesta, will remain unattainable.