Feni Corridor: A Crucial Frontier for Bangladesh's Sovereignty and Security

In the quiet, often-overlooked stretch of Parshuram Upazila in Bangladesh’s Feni district lies a geographical sliver that carries extraordinary strategic weight. Here, in certain segments, the land between the Feni River and the Indian border narrows to a mere 300 to 500 meters—a fragile geographic configuration that renders the area not only vulnerable but alarmingly susceptible to external encroachment. Far from being a simple border zone, this land constitutes a natural strategic corridor that could decisively influence the future of Bangladesh’s sovereignty, defense integrity, and regional stability.

It would be dangerously simplistic to view this corridor as just another cartographic detail or a narrow boundary passage. This is, in essence, a geostrategic bottleneck—one that plays a pivotal role in border management, defense logistics, intelligence coordination, and economic sustainability. Bangladesh cannot afford to downplay the significance of this corridor, especially as India continues to implement what appears to be a deliberate and multi-pronged infrastructural and intelligence buildup near the region, under the guise of ‘development’ and ‘security enhancement.’

First and foremost, the narrowness of this corridor intensifies its vulnerability. In many parts of Parshuram, Bangladesh’s land stretches no wider than a few hundred meters between the Feni River and the Indian border. This geographic thinness leaves the territory acutely exposed. With such limited buffer, the risk of illegal transborder activities—ranging from smuggling and arms trafficking to cross-border infiltration—increases exponentially. Furthermore, the terrain severely restricts the deployment and maneuverability of Bangladeshi security forces, unless a permanent presence is established and maintained. This stretch of land is not just thin—it is brittle, and if left unprotected, it may shatter under strategic pressure.

Moreover, this corridor is vital to the broader defense calculus of southeastern Bangladesh. The military significance of Chittagong and Cox’s Bazar is well-established, both in terms of their commercial importance and their value as logistical hubs. In any crisis—be it military confrontation or natural disaster—this corridor offers an alternative route for troop mobilization, logistical support, or emergency relief operations. Should India manage to assert dominance over this corridor, it would obtain the strategic upper hand over Bangladesh’s southeastern territories. Such control could facilitate the imposition of both military and economic pressure, potentially destabilizing internal dynamics in a region already delicate due to its proximity to the hilly tracts.

The Feni River is far more than a border demarcation—it is a lifeline. It sustains the irrigation systems of the surrounding plains and hills, supports agricultural output, and acts as a natural flood control channel. Any attempt by India to manipulate the flow of this river—especially through infrastructure such as sluice gates or dams—would directly threaten Bangladesh’s agricultural productivity and environmental balance. During the dry season, such manipulations could induce water scarcity, affecting thousands of farmers and communities. Conversely, in the monsoon months, artificial redirection of water could exacerbate flooding, putting lives and livelihoods at risk. The ecological consequences would ripple far beyond the immediate corridor.

Equally critical is the strategic vantage point the corridor offers over India’s northeastern state of Tripura. This area provides a natural observational elevation from which railways, highways, and even military facilities in Tripura can be monitored. If effectively utilized, it could form a key node in Bangladesh’s intelligence and surveillance apparatus. Conversely, if ceded—whether through neglect or bilateral compromise—it could allow India to reverse the surveillance advantage, turning Bangladesh’s own territory into a conduit for external monitoring.

The implications here extend beyond local intelligence. If India gains unimpeded access to this area, it could incorporate it into its broader military strategy concerning its northeastern region, famously known as the ‘Seven Sisters.’ These states are geopolitically sensitive and crucial for India’s connectivity ambitions. Control over the Feni Corridor would serve as a strategic bridge linking mainland India with its northeastern territories, enabling smoother troop and resource movement in times of need, and simultaneously allowing Indian forces to encircle Bangladesh’s southeast with greater ease.

India’s infrastructural expansion near the Feni Corridor is not incidental. It reflects a calculated and consistent effort to consolidate influence along Bangladesh’s eastern frontier. Over recent years, India has constructed roads, bridges, barrages, and dams in close proximity to this sensitive border. While these developments are often framed as internal infrastructure projects, their proximity and alignment reveal their dual-use nature. In the event of heightened tensions, these pathways could facilitate rapid deployment of Indian troops and defense hardware.

The construction of sluice gates and flood control mechanisms on the Indian side can also serve as subtle levers of pressure. They allow India to modulate water flow, effectively weaponizing natural resources to exert political or economic influence on Bangladesh. This silent, slow-building tactic of infrastructural domination should not be underestimated—it is a form of power projection that bypasses the need for open conflict, yet achieves strategic depth.

Furthermore, the corridor offers a fertile ground for intelligence operations. It is well-suited for installation of surveillance equipment such as long-range sensors, radio-frequency antennas, and UAV bases. Such infrastructure would enable India to monitor troop movements, military installations, and civilian activity in southeastern Bangladesh. The intelligence reach would extend from the Chittagong Hill Tracts to Cox’s Bazar, enveloping the heart of Bangladesh’s coastal defense infrastructure.

The threat is not limited to overt surveillance. Indian intelligence agencies, particularly RAW, have a historical precedent of operating within and around Bangladesh’s border regions. Given its sensitive geography and relative lack of oversight, the Feni Corridor could become a new staging ground for covert intelligence missions, including recruitment of informants, surveillance of internal dynamics, and even the incitement of unrest in sensitive communities.

The Chittagong Hill Tracts, with its history of ethnic strife and insurgency, remain a vulnerable target for external manipulation. Utilizing the Feni Corridor as a forward base, hostile intelligence agencies could stoke instability, supply proxy actors, or even initiate information warfare against the state. Without a comprehensive security and surveillance mechanism in place, Bangladesh risks leaving a strategic backdoor wide open.

In 2019, Bangladesh granted India the right to draw 1.82 cusecs of water from the Feni River for Tripura’s Sabroom town. This gesture was publicly framed as an act of goodwill and regional cooperation. However, such decisions must be analyzed within the broader context of India’s regional water strategy—a strategy marked by upstream dam-building and unilateral river management.

Control over the Feni River would allow India to impose a form of hydro-hegemony over parts of southeastern Bangladesh. During the dry months, controlled withdrawals could induce water stress; during the rains, increased discharge could aggravate floods. In both cases, Bangladesh would find itself at the mercy of Indian water policy. Over time, this leverage could be transformed into political capital, allowing India to dictate terms in broader bilateral negotiations.

Given these multi-dimensional threats, Bangladesh must act decisively and preemptively. First and foremost, establishing a robust, permanent military presence in the corridor is not optional—it is essential. The symbolic and operational importance of maintaining an active defense force in this area cannot be overstated. Deploying a forward company or at least a platoon would serve both as a deterrent and a flag-bearer of sovereignty.

In tandem, joint patrol mechanisms involving the Bangladesh Army and Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB) should be institutionalized. Bunkers, mobile check posts, and fortified patrol routes should be erected to reinforce border integrity and enable swift responses to incursions. These are not mere tactical enhancements; they are expressions of territorial ownership.

Simultaneously, Bangladesh must cultivate a resilient intelligence ecosystem within the corridor. Embedding human intelligence networks among local communities—fishermen, farmers, and traders—can yield real-time information about unusual activities or external agents. This HUMINT framework should be integrated with technical surveillance tools, including drone patrols, thermal cameras, and mobile monitoring towers.

To unify these efforts, a dedicated intelligence cell—perhaps designated as the Feni Corridor Intelligence Cell (FCIC)—should be established under military command. It would be responsible for aggregating data, managing local assets, and coordinating with national intelligence agencies. The FCIC could also serve as a hub for cyber surveillance and digital monitoring, tracking disinformation campaigns or coordinated foreign propaganda efforts aimed at destabilizing border communities.

Physical defense must be matched by infrastructural development. Along the border, Bangladesh should construct strategically placed roads, bridges, and transport routes that allow for rapid military and humanitarian deployment. Emergency helipads, fuel depots, and logistics hubs should be installed to bolster wartime readiness. Crisis shelters for civilians—complete with food, medical supplies, and communication facilities—can ensure orderly evacuations if required.

Beyond the battlefield, diplomacy must become an active front. India’s unilateral constructions and strategic maneuvers represent breaches of existing bilateral understandings and international border protocols. Bangladesh must lodge formal diplomatic protests and demand accountability in the regular meetings of the Border Coordination Committees. Furthermore, these concerns must be internationalized—presented at forums such as the UN Border Conflict Prevention Framework and the SAARC Regional Security Dialogues.

Alliances should also be strategically leveraged. Countries with a vested interest in a balanced South Asian order—such as China, Turkey, and Malaysia—may be willing to offer technical or diplomatic support. Engaging them in dialogue could counterbalance India’s expanding regional influence and fortify Bangladesh’s negotiating position.

The Feni Corridor is no longer a peripheral concern. It is the pivot of Bangladesh’s southeastern security matrix—a critical node where geography, strategy, and sovereignty intersect. India’s expanding footprint in this region, through infrastructure, intelligence, and water control, is not incidental; it is strategic. And it demands a strategic counter-response.

Bangladesh must recognize the Feni Corridor for what it truly is: not just a piece of borderland, but the keystone of national integrity in the southeast. Ignoring it now could result in irreversible losses later. It is time for the state to rise to the challenge, to embed strength in the soil, to raise vigilance along the banks, and to declare—through presence, preparedness, and principle—that this land is not up for compromise.