Arakan: A Lost Land or a Future Province?

The geopolitical landscape of Myanmar’s Rakhine State has undergone a seismic shift with the rapid rise of the Arakan Army (AA). Once a marginalized insurgent group, the AA has transformed into a formidable political and military force, challenging both the central government in Naypyidaw and the region’s traditional power structures. With its de facto control over vast swathes of Rakhine, including the entire border with Bangladesh, the AA has redefined the balance of power in the region. For centuries, Arakan—historically known as the Kingdom of Mrauk U—has been a contested land caught between larger powers, from the Mughal and Burmese empires to the colonial dominion of the British. Today, its future remains uncertain: is it on the path to full autonomy or even independence, or will it be reintegrated under Myanmar’s central authority? This emerging reality presents a new challenge for regional diplomacy, particularly for Bangladesh, which now faces an evolving security and strategic calculus along its southeastern frontier. With state-to-state diplomatic norms being disrupted by the rise of a non-state actor, Dhaka and other stakeholders must reassess their approach to Rakhine’s uncertain future.

The Rohingya crisis remains one of the most pressing humanitarian challenges in South Asia. Since the 2017 military crackdown in Myanmar, over 730,000 Rohingya refugees have sought shelter in Bangladesh. Despite multiple repatriation agreements between Dhaka and Naypyitaw, the Myanmar military’s reluctance to create conducive conditions for safe return has resulted in diplomatic stagnation. The recent rise of the Arakan Army (AA), a Rakhine nationalist armed group, has fundamentally altered the balance of power in Myanmar’s western frontier. This development necessitates a reassessment of Bangladesh’s diplomatic approach to the crisis.

Ethnic Background: The Arakan Army represents the Rakhine people, who are ethnically related to the Burmese but have their own distinct language, culture, and history. Rakhine State is one of the poorest and most underdeveloped regions in Myanmar, and the people have long complained of discrimination and marginalization by the central government.

Formation and Aims: Initially, the Arakan Army was founded as a self-defense militia, responding to perceived oppression and neglect by Myanmar’s central government. Over time, its goals evolved to include seeking greater autonomy, self-determination, and rights for the Rakhine people. Some have also called for an independent Rakhine state, though this remains a contentious issue.

Relationship with the Tatmadaw: The Arakan Army has clashed repeatedly with Myanmar’s military forces, particularly in Rakhine State. The group’s resistance against the Tatmadaw has been marked by guerilla tactics and ambushes, and it has played a role in the broader ethnic insurgency landscape of Myanmar, where numerous ethnic armed groups have fought for autonomy for decades.

Role in the Rohingya Crisis: While the Arakan Army is primarily concerned with the rights of the Rakhine people, the group has been involved in the larger, complex ethnic conflicts in Myanmar. The Rakhine State has been the site of significant violence against the Rohingya Muslim minority, with the military accused of carrying out genocidal acts in 2017. However, the Arakan Army and the Rohingya groups have different political goals, and the AA has not been directly involved in the Rohingya crisis, though the instability in the region has affected all communities.

To hinder the Arakan Army’s (AA) progress, the Myanmar military has revived its long-standing divide-and-rule tactics, exacerbating tensions between the Muslim Rohingya and the Rakhine community. This strategy includes the forced conscription of Rohingya still residing in Myanmar, further entrenching divisions in an already fragile region. In an unexpected and complex development, Rohingya armed groups have aligned with the Myanmar military, actively supporting its operations against the AA. Since early this year, these groups have even engaged in coercive recruitment, forcing at least 2,000 Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh to fight alongside the military against the AA. This move has deepened mistrust and further complicated the conflict dynamics.

Both the AA and the Rohingya have, in different ways, played into the Myanmar military’s efforts to sow discord. Inflammatory rhetoric and the rapid spread of misinformation and disinformation have fueled hostilities, particularly in the midst of a sweeping communication blackout covering nearly all of Rakhine. The absence of reliable information has created an environment where narratives are shaped by propaganda rather than verified facts, increasing the likelihood of further violence and instability. Rohingya communities, for their part, have sought to downplay the extent to which Rohingya armed groups are actively engaged in combat, while the AA faces serious allegations of human rights abuses against Rohingya civilians. The AA, however, has categorically denied these accusations in a manner that strains credibility.

The relationship between the Rakhine and Rohingya communities has reached its lowest point since at least 2012, a year that saw deadly communal violence resulting in nearly 200 deaths and the displacement of approximately 150,000 people. The deepening animosity between these groups is not only a direct consequence of the ongoing conflict but also a reflection of long-standing grievances and mutual distrust, which have been exacerbated by the Myanmar military’s manipulative strategies.

Despite its opposition to the military, the AA has been viewed as a potential force that could offer a more viable path to Rohingya repatriation compared to Myanmar’s ruling junta. However, skepticism is growing among both Bangladesh and the Rohingya themselves regarding the feasibility of returning to a Rakhine state under AA control. With hostilities intensifying and no clear resolution in sight, hopes for a safe and sustainable repatriation process are fading, leaving thousands of displaced Rohingya in a state of prolonged uncertainty.

International Recognition and Controversy: The Arakan Army has been designated as a terrorist organization by Myanmar’s government, which has led to significant international debate over the group’s tactics and objectives. The Myanmar government has accused the AA of using terrorism and committing atrocities in its fight against the state. On the other hand, the group has received some support from the local population in Rakhine State, who view the Tatmadaw as an oppressive force.

Key Humanitarian Challenges: The political situation, compounded by ongoing humanitarian issues in both Rakhine and Bangladesh, continues to worsen. According to the AA’s humanitarian branch, over 600,000 people have been newly displaced in Rakhine, a figure that does not account for those displaced before 2020 or in areas controlled by the military. The situation is worsened by the military’s two-year blockade of Rakhine, which persisted even through a major cyclone last May that claimed hundreds of lives. The blockade has led to severe shortages of essential goods like medicine, food, and fuel, causing a rise in the cost of basic commodities. Aid and trade have only been able to reach limited areas in Rakhine from Bangladesh across the border. The ongoing conflict and humanitarian crisis in Rakhine have also forced over 40,000 additional Rohingya refugees into Bangladesh since the start of this year, according to a recent headcount by the UN refugee agency and Bangladesh.

While the refugee camps in Cox’s Bazar are more stable and accessible than Rakhine, they are still fraught with dangers. Security threats are rising, with daily clashes between rival Rohingya armed groups, including the Rohingya Solidarity Organization and the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army. Issues like extortion, abductions, and gender-based violence are widespread. The space for Rohingya civil society is limited, and there are few legal work opportunities or chances to access formal education. The region also faces two annual cyclone seasons and long monsoon rains that increase the risk of flooding and landslides. Rohingya refugees survive on rations of just over $12 per person per month, and the quality and availability of healthcare are inconsistent. Furthermore, the challenges are expected to worsen: While donors have funded the humanitarian response in Cox’s Bazar with nearly $650 million annually since 2017, funding has decreased to $420 million this year, and further declines are expected as the crisis in Rakhine competes for attention and resources amid ongoing conflicts like the war in Ukraine and violence in the Middle East.

For decades, Bangladesh’s approach to Myanmar has been centered on state-to-state diplomacy, engaging primarily with Naypyitaw regardless of the shifting power dynamics within Myanmar. Even after the Rohingya crisis escalated in 2017, Dhaka continued its reliance on Myanmar’s central government—including the military junta that orchestrated the genocide. This approach, however, has been riddled with miscalculations.

Myanmar’s military regime has repeatedly demonstrated its unwillingness to resolve the Rohingya issue in good faith. Despite signing repatriation agreements, it has failed to implement them, instead prolonging the crisis while offering only token gestures of cooperation. Over 730,000 Rohingya refugees remain in limbo in Bangladesh, with no viable pathway for return as the military shows no inclination to create conditions conducive to their safe repatriation. Dhaka’s persistence in engaging with the junta, despite these repeated betrayals, has resulted in diplomatic stagnation.

Rakhine State, with its abundance of natural resources and strategic positioning along the Bay of Bengal, has become an essential area of focus for China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This initiative, which aims to connect China with countries across Asia, Europe, and beyond through infrastructure and trade, has seen significant investment in Rakhine. The region’s economic potential, coupled with its geographical significance, aligns with China’s broader ambitions in the Indian Ocean region.

1. Kyaukphyu Deep-Sea Port: One of the central elements of China’s investment in Rakhine is the Kyaukphyu deep-sea port, which is being developed as part of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC). The port serves as a crucial gateway for Chinese trade, allowing goods to bypass the congested Malacca Strait. It will facilitate direct maritime access to the Indian Ocean, enhancing China’s trade routes and reducing reliance on other, longer maritime paths. This deep-sea port is not only a major infrastructure development but also a critical point in China’s efforts to strengthen its economic and strategic presence in Southeast Asia.

2. Shwe Gas Pipeline: Another critical project is the Shwe gas pipeline, which transports natural gas from offshore fields in the Bay of Bengal to China through Myanmar. The pipeline allows China to secure a direct and more reliable source of energy from the region, providing a strategic energy route that bypasses the more vulnerable sea routes through the Strait of Malacca. This infrastructure project is central to China’s energy security strategy, as it ensures a stable supply of natural gas to China’s growing economy.

Rakhine’s infrastructure projects, particularly the Kyaukphyu port and Shwe gas pipeline, play an important role in China’s broader geopolitical strategy. By improving access to the Indian Ocean, China enhances its ability to influence maritime trade routes and energy flow in the region. This positions Rakhine as a critical node in China’s regional strategy, particularly as China seeks to assert itself as a dominant economic and geopolitical player in Asia.

The development of Rakhine also holds significance in the context of China’s rivalry with other regional powers, particularly India. The strategic access to the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean allows China to counterbalance India’s influence in the region. Moreover, the port and pipeline contribute to China’s vision of creating a network of trade and infrastructure that can increase its economic influence while mitigating potential vulnerabilities from maritime choke points.

The Belt and Road Initiative projects in Rakhine serve dual purposes: securing energy routes and expanding economic influence while enhancing China’s geopolitical leverage. They also provide China with a foothold in a region rich in resources and key strategic importance. However, these projects have not been without controversy. They have faced opposition from local communities and the Myanmar military, as well as concerns from international observers about the long-term implications of such extensive Chinese investments. Additionally, the instability in Rakhine due to ongoing conflict and humanitarian crises adds further complexity to China’s ambitions, as the region’s volatility poses risks to the sustainability and security of these large-scale infrastructure projects.

In summary, Rakhine’s wealth of resources and strategic location make it a key part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, with major infrastructure projects like the Kyaukphyu deep-sea port and Shwe gas pipeline solidifying its role in China’s broader regional and global strategy. These projects not only secure China’s energy routes but also enhance its strategic position in the Indian Ocean, amplifying its economic and geopolitical influence in Southeast Asia.

The Arakan Army’s increasing dominance marks a turning point in Myanmar’s internal conflict, particularly in Rakhine State. Over the past few months, the AA has captured strategic military positions, including the Western Regional Command headquarters in Ann, severely undermining the Myanmar military’s hold over the region. The group now exercises de facto control over much of Rakhine, including the border with Bangladesh, giving it significant influence over cross-border security, refugee movements, and humanitarian aid operations.

This power shift has direct implications for Bangladesh. First, the AA’s control of the border alters the security landscape, as it can dictate the movement of people, goods, and potentially armed groups. Second, with the Myanmar military weakened in Rakhine, the prospect of a negotiated solution for the Rohingya crisis must now factor in the Arakan Army’s role. Third, humanitarian efforts aimed at assisting both displaced populations in Rakhine and the Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh may require engagement with the AA, given its growing administrative and military authority.

Despite a change in government in Dhaka, Bangladesh’s stance on the Rohingya crisis remains unchanged. The country continues to push for the repatriation of Rohingya refugees to Rakhine State, a goal that aligns with the aspirations of most Rohingya themselves. However, frustration persists over the lack of tangible progress in achieving this objective.

The current government in Bangladesh faces an even more complex set of challenges than its predecessor in facilitating Rohingya repatriation. The fragile ceasefire between Myanmar’s military and the Arakan Army (AA), a predominantly Buddhist Rakhine ethnic armed group, collapsed in November 2023, triggering a surge in hostilities. Since then, the AA has rapidly expanded its territorial control, taking full control of 10 out of 17 townships in Rakhine State (along with Paletwa in neighboring Chin State) and establishing partial dominance over several others. This makes the AA the largest and most powerful non-state armed group in Myanmar in terms of both land and 

population under its authority.

Despite these developments, Bangladesh’s official stance remains rigid. Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mohammed Rafiqul Alam recently reiterated Bangladesh’s focus on border security while refraining from commenting on any potential engagement with the Arakan Army. This cautious approach aligns with conventional diplomatic norms but falls short of addressing the evolving reality on the ground.

One of Dhaka’s primary mistakes has been its reluctance to recognize that traditional state-to-state diplomacy is not always the most effective path, particularly when dealing with a junta that has little incentive to engage meaningfully. Myanmar’s military has repeatedly demonstrated its brutal tactics, as evidenced by reports of mass violence, including beheadings, rape, and torture, documented by UN experts. Given the military’s indifference to humanitarian concerns and its declining control over Rakhine, it is increasingly unrealistic to expect productive negotiations on the Rohingya issue through Naypyitaw alone.

Unlike the Myanmar military, the Arakan Army has signaled a different approach to governance. While still a nonstate actor, it has displayed a willingness to negotiate and administer territories under its control. Notably, the AA’s leadership has articulated a vision for an inclusive Rakhine that encompasses both the Buddhist Rakhine and Muslim communities, including the Rohingya. Although such statements should be scrutinized for sincerity, they present an opening for dialogue that was absent under the junta’s rule.

A New Avenue for Rohingya Repatriation: If the AA is genuinely interested in an inclusive Rakhine, Bangladesh could leverage diplomatic channels to push for a repatriation framework that ensures the safety and rights of returning Rohingya refugees.

Enhanced Border Security: Direct or indirect engagement with the AA could help mitigate cross-border security threats, including arms smuggling and illicit trafficking, by establishing clearer communication and coordination mechanisms.

Humanitarian Cooperation: With much of Rakhine now under AA control, international humanitarian organizations may find it more feasible to operate in the region. Bangladesh could facilitate these efforts to alleviate humanitarian suffering on both sides of the border.

Breaking Diplomatic Deadlock: Continuing to rely solely on Myanmar’s junta has led to repeated diplomatic failures. A more flexible approach, which includes dialogue with relevant stakeholders in Rakhine, could inject momentum into stalled negotiations.

While engagement with the Arakan Army offers potential advantages, it also comes with risks. The AA remains a rebel group engaged in an armed struggle against the Myanmar military. Any formal recognition or support could strain Bangladesh’s relations with Naypyitaw and complicate its broader diplomatic positioning. Additionally, it is unclear how much autonomy the AA truly has in shaping policy regarding the Rohingya, as its long-term governance vision is still evolving.

However, absolute non-engagement is equally risky. Ignoring the AA’s rise could leave Bangladesh out of critical discussions shaping Rakhine’s future. A balanced approach—one that cautiously explores dialogue while maintaining diplomatic flexibility—would allow Dhaka to adapt to shifting dynamics without prematurely committing to a position that may backfire.

The emergence of the Arakan Army as the dominant force in Rakhine State marks a pivotal moment for Bangladesh’s foreign policy. Clinging to outdated strategies centered solely on Myanmar’s central government is no longer viable, given the junta’s declining influence and unwillingness to engage meaningfully. Instead, Bangladesh must reassess its approach and consider pragmatic engagement with the Arakan Army, carefully evaluating the risks and opportunities involved.

By adopting a more nuanced, flexible strategy, Dhaka can better navigate the evolving power dynamics in Rakhine, enhance border security, and potentially create new pathways for resolving the protracted Rohingya crisis. The status quo has changed Bangladesh must respond accordingly.